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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Various plan-design 
elements have emerged 
that seem to provide better 
adequacy of workers’ 
compensation benefits 
than the medical-based 
impairment and gross earnings 
replacement approach.
 
n Disability management 
techniques appear to have the 
capacity to significantly reduce 
the burden of work-related 
disability for both workers and 
employers in our workplaces.
n Workers’ compensation 
programs have tools available 
to improve employer safety 
and prevention performance.
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Regulating Access to 
Work in the Gig Labor 
Market: The Case of Uber
Morris M. Kleiner
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Workers’ compensation programs are state-
level insurance programs that provide medical 
care and income replacement benefits for people 
injured at work. Although states’ rules differ 
along various dimensions, each state other than 
Texas has statutes that require employers to 
provide insurance with specified benefits. Since 
each workers’ compensation program is unique, 
comparisons across programs can be complicated 
or impossible. Moreover, data on occupational 
injuries, compensation, safety, and accommodation 
practices at firms are typically unavailable. When 
data are available, they can be suspect and suffer 
from the disadvantage that they often come from 
a single jurisdiction. Also, since different data and 
methods are used across studies, results can be 
difficult to compare across studies and to generalize 
to other workers’ compensation systems. The result 
is a rather sparse and dubious-quality research 
literature. 
In our new book, Workers’ Compensation: 
Analysis for Its Second Century (see p. 7), we 
discuss and analyze the status of state workers’ 
compensation programs along the three 
dimensions of benefit adequacy, return to work, 
and prevention incentives using the research record 
that has been compiled to date. We highlight the 
often-contrasting incentives that firms, workers, 
and insurers face as they operate within these 
programs. We consider recent trends in workers’ 
compensation, discuss innovations that have yet to 
be evaluated, and try to draw conclusions from the 
research whenever possible and point to gaps in 
our knowledge that future research should address.
Benefit Adequacy
The chapter on benefit adequacy reviews recent 
studies of workers’ compensation in Canada 
and Michigan. Michigan is unique because, 
unlike other states, it does not have a statutory 
designation of permanent partial disability. And as 
a “wage-loss” state, Michigan law provides that lost 
earnings benefits shall be paid for the duration of 
the disability, with a few exceptions. This contrasts 
with other states with an “impairment” orientation, 
where a medical assessment of the degree of 
disability is made and benefit payments are 
derived from that rating. Furthermore, there is no 
designation of the level of disability in Michigan, 
so there is no impairment rating available, only a 
record of the payments made. Canadian workers’ 
compensation systems are similar to those in the 
United States except that all workers’ compensation 
insurance is with public entities, benefits are 
typically more generous, and waiting periods are 
shorter or nonexistent.
A study from the Workers Compensation 
Research Institute finds that the Michigan workers’ 
compensation system provides more adequate 
benefits than many other state systems (Savych and 
Hunt 2017). Figure 1 charts workers’ compensation 
benefits and postinjury earnings for workers with 
more than one month of lost work time or a lump-
sum settlement compared to earnings of similar 
workers with injuries that did not qualify for wage 
replacement benefits. There is a marked drop in 
earnings after the injury and a decline in earnings 
that lasts at least five years, but the addition of 
workers’ compensation benefits brings the earnings 
replacement rate to 97 percent at 5 years and 88 
percent when projected out to 10 years. 
This performance appears to be largely due 
to the wage-loss orientation and the “spendable 
earnings” wage replacement formula used in 
Michigan. Taking account of income taxes, 
payroll taxes, and family size clearly provides the 
opportunity for tailoring wage-loss replacement 
more closely to apparent need across all workers. 
The Current State of Workers’ 
Compensation
Benefit Adequacy, Return to Work, and Prevention 
Marcus Dillender and H. Allan Hunt
So, despite a lower maximum benefit 
in Michigan, set at 90 percent of the 
state average weekly wage versus 100 
percent in most U.S. jurisdictions, 
workers’ compensation wage-loss 
benefits in Michigan look pretty good. 
But if benefits in Michigan appear to be 
higher than those in some other states, 
they are clearly not as generous as in 
the Canadian systems that have been 
subjected to similar wage-loss studies. 
Return to Work
While ensuring adequate 
compensation is a basic legislated 
priority of workers’ compensation, 
returning injured workers to 
employment swiftly and safely lowers 
compensation costs for employers and 
helps workers by raising their incomes 
and by serving as part of their physical 
and emotional recovery from an injury. 
In our chapter on return to work, 
we discuss disability management 
techniques designed to improve return-
to-work performance that include 
maintaining close contact with the 
injured worker, improving medical 
management, and accommodating 
limitations at work.
Disability management’s promise 
for improving the return-to-work 
performance of workers’ compensation 
systems is reflected in the proliferation 
of state policy innovations that directly 
or indirectly support or encourage 
these interventions. Credible evidence 
on the impact of return-to-work 
programs is sparse but promising. 
Reductions of up to 40 percent in 
disability duration have been reported 
among large self-insured firms 
(McLaren, Reville, and Seabury 2010), 
and several review articles have found 
strong empirical support for the effects 
of disability management techniques. 
The widespread adoption of 
such techniques among private 
employers throughout the 1990s also 
demonstrates their efficacy. Figure 2 
shows how the balance has shifted from 
injuries with days away from work 
to those with restricted activity only. 
This serves as evidence of the spread 
of disability management techniques. 
We conclude that properly motivated 
disability management techniques can 
remove many barriers to return-to-
work for workers with impairments, 
which reduces both workers’ 
compensation costs for employers and 
lost wages for workers. 
Prevention
As the need for income benefits 
and return-to-work considerations 
can both be avoided if injuries are 
prevented in the first place, we also 
discuss how workers’ compensation 
insurance can affect both workers’ 
and firms’ prevention efforts. As can 
be seen in Figure 3, average wage 
loss benefits and average medical 
benefits have both fallen since the early 
1990s as occupational injury rates 
have dropped, but wage loss benefits 
have fallen much more dramatically 
than medical benefits. The increased 
medical benefits as a percentage of 
all workers’ compensation benefits 
makes the need for prevention efforts 
an important component of cost 
containment considerations regardless 
of a state’s benefit adequacy.
In the chapter on prevention, we 
discuss how workers’ compensation 
alters both firms’ and workers’ inherent 
incentives to prevent occupational 
injuries and diseases. For workers, 
more adequate compensation benefits 
reduce the costs of injuries, which 
lower their incentives to avoid injury. 
For firms with experience-rated 
premiums, higher claim costs increase 
future premiums, meaning that 
experience rating gives firms a financial 
incentive to improve safety. Empirical 
work has devoted considerable 
attention to trying to understand 
which of these conflicting effects 
dominates, but it is often stymied by 
the simultaneous effect of workers’ 
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Figure 1  Average Quarterly Earnings, Workers’ Compensation Income Replacement Benefits, 
and Reweighted Comparison Earnings, by Quarter from Injury, Injuries in Michigan in 2004
NOTE:  Indemnity injury sample includes workers who had more than one month of lost time or received lump-
sum payments. Comparison-sample quarterly earnings information covers period between 2003 and 2008.
SOURCE:  Savych and Hunt (2017).
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compensation benefits on reporting 
incentives conditional on the number 
of true injuries at a firm. When benefits 
are higher, workers have an increased 
incentive to report injuries, while firms 
have incentives to suppress reporting 
of injuries. 
Although much existing empirical 
evidence points to a positive 
relationship between frequency of 
injuries and the level of workers’ 
compensation benefits (e.g., Krueger 
1990; Ruser 1985), we feel the evidence 
is not persuasive that better workers’ 
compensation benefits actually 
encourage workers to act more 
recklessly. However, making workers’ 
compensation premiums more 
accurately reflect the previous claims 
history of individual employers appears 
to improve employers’ safety and 
prevention efforts, as well as encourage 
employers to devote more attention to 
the worker’s successful return to work. 
Conclusions
Given the current state of 
knowledge, we believe that workers’ 
compensation programs could be 
improved along several dimensions. 
However, there seems to be a 
reluctance to consider improvements 
under the existing political 
environment. More research is needed 
on various workers’ compensation 
issues, but we also believe that there 
are reasons for optimism about the 
three performance dimensions that 
we consider. With benefit adequacy, 
various plan-design elements have 
emerged that seem to provide better 
adequacy of workers’ compensation 
benefits than the medical-based 
impairment and gross earnings 
replacement approach. With return 
to work, disability management 
techniques appear to have the 
capacity to significantly reduce the 
burden of work-related disability for 
both workers and employers in our 
workplaces. With prevention, workers’ 
compensation programs appear to have 
tools available to improve employer 
safety and prevention performance. 
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SOURCE: Ruser (1999).
Figure 2  National Trends in Rates Associated with Lost Workdays
Figure 3  Workers’ Compensation Medical and Cash Benefits per $100 of Covered Wages, 
1980–2012
SOURCE: Estimates from the National Academy of Social Insurance.
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U.S. labor markets traditionally 
have included long-term employment 
relationships that last many years 
or decades. They also have been 
characterized by internal labor 
markets, unions, and a web of rules 
that, often by law, both employers and 
workers are required to observe. New 
innovations and technologies, such as 
smart phones and their accompanying 
apps, have allowed labor markets to 
become more fluid and responsive 
to spot market supply and demand 
conditions. They have allowed workers 
more flexibility in their choice of hours 
worked, and have allowed consumers 
to better evaluate the quality of 
services. As a result, gig labor markets, 
which let workers easily book jobs by 
the hour or project, have grown and 
flourished. The number of workers 
directly working through apps now 
comprise nearly 1 percent of the total 
workforce, making gig labor markets 
one of the fastest growing areas in the 
labor force (Katz and Krueger 2016; 
Torpey and Hogan 2016). 
Workers who have entered the 
gig labor market have few of the 
government regulations or web of 
rules that govern traditional labor 
markets. In addition, labor laws such as 
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the 
National Labor Relations Act usually 
do not apply to these workers (Harris 
and Krueger 2015). Yet one area of 
labor market regulation, occupational 
licensing, is pervasive, and in this 
article, I examine the interaction of this 
institution in one large company that 
operates largely in the gig economy.  
The Uber Innovation
The ride-sharing firm Uber 
has come to exemplify the recent 
technology “revolution” and labor 
market outcomes embodied in the 
gig economy. It had 84–87 percent 
of the total ride-sharing trips (i.e., 
cab-substitute markets) in 2016 and 
is currently active in 450 cities in 
the United States and worldwide.1 
Uber began offering its first rides in 
2010 in San Francisco and in New 
York City in 2011 as a way to match 
individuals who needed rides to work 
or recreation with those individuals 
who were willing to provide those rides 
for a price. The creation of an app and 
accompanying software allowed this 
matching process to be done in an 
efficient and profitable manner for the 
company (Roth and Ockenfels 2002).  
Uber takes a percentage of the ride 
price for the company as their fee for 
matching the drivers and riders. The 
drivers anticipate an ample supply of 
customers, and the waiting times for 
drivers in traditional cabs were reduced 
and revenues enhanced for those 
Count us among those who believe 
that today’s workers’ compensation 
programs have the potential to serve 
for another 100 years, but they will 
require significant improvement. We 
call upon legislative bodies to address 
current shortcomings, and we call 
upon the research community to 
provide appropriate guidance for these 
efforts. 
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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n The number of workers directly working through apps now comprise nearly 1 per-
cent of the total workforce, making gig labor markets one of the fastest growing areas 
in the labor force.
n Evidence from a quasi-experiment in New York and New Jersey suggests that 
there are few gains from occupational licensing of ride-sharing providers as assessed 
through customer satisfaction or measures of customer safety.
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5on the quality of services (Kleiner 
and Kudrle 2000). However, a recent 
analysis in the New York City/New 
Jersey area notes that drivers who 
sign up to drive on the Uber app can 
perform pickups in New Jersey, which 
is directly on the opposite side of the 
Hudson River from New York City, 
but drivers who sign-up in New Jersey, 
which does not require an occupational 
license, cannot perform pickups in the 
city (Hall et al. 2017). Thus, the study 
compares quality and safety outcomes 
for rides performed in New Jersey by 
New York City and New Jersey drivers. 
There is quasi-random assignment 
of rides because Uber’s dispatch 
algorithm, which determines the driver 
for a particular ride request, is based 
on factors other than licensing. While 
the algorithm has evolved over time, it 
is mainly based on a driver’s proximity 
to a rider’s location (also based on time 
to the customer). Consequently, a ride 
is essentially randomly assigned to a 
licensed driver from New York City or 
an unlicensed driver from New Jersey 
for pick-up requests that occur in many 
EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH  •  JULY 2017 W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
providing rides. Drivers can choose 
when and how many hours they want 
to work.  In 2017 the company had 
more than 734,000 active drivers in the 
United States and more than 1,500,000 
drivers worldwide.2 The economic 
value of the company is estimated to be 
almost $70 billion, and despite recent 
negative publicity, it is still one of the 
major economic success stories and 
labor market innovators (Bensinger 
2017).
One unique aspect of the Uber 
performance evaluation system is that 
the customer evaluates the driver and 
vice-versa on a scale of one to five, with 
five being the highest. The majority—
nearly 86 percent—of drivers earn 
a rating of 5. Drivers and customers 
whose ratings fall below a specified 
value determined by the company lose 
their ability to access the app and are 
effectively fired from using the ride-
sharing system. Consequently, there 
are incentives for both customers and 
drivers to do well in their respective 
roles. 
Regulations for Driving 
One of the major labor market 
issues affecting Uber drivers is 
occupational licensing (Porter 
2015). About one-quarter of the U.S. 
workforce must acquire a license from 
the government in order to work 
for pay (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2016). In some cities—New York, for 
example—ride-sharing without a taxi 
license is illegal. The requirements 
for licensure in New York City are 
stringent, and the licensure process 
takes three months on average, with 
upfront costs of at least $2,000. In 
addition, the driver must complete 
a defensive driving course, pass a 
medical exam, be subjected to a 
drug test, undergo fingerprint and 
background checks, take classes on 
wheelchair-accessible vehicle training, 
acquire a commercial vehicle license, 
and purchase commercial vehicle 
insurance. These substantial fixed costs 
result in fewer drivers but much lower 
turnover rates for Uber drivers in New 
York than in any other U.S. city where 
the company operates; they also result 
in longer working hours (Hall et al. 
2017).  Figure 1 shows driver turnover 
by city. New York City has lower 
turnover, and Houston, which has few 
regulations for drivers, has relatively 
high turnover of drivers.
Figure 2 shows that the ratio of New 
York Uber drivers to the population of 
the city or the metropolitan statistical 
area is considerably lower than either 
Chicago or San Francisco, and the base 
prices are higher (Hall et al. 2017). 
Although traditional medallion taxi 
drivers can serve as substitutes for 
Uber drivers in any city, the number 
of Uber drivers in New York is 
considerably lower than in Chicago 
or San Francisco. Also, the base Uber 
fares in Chicago and San Francisco are 
lower than those in New York City for 
both 2015 and 2016. 
Evaluating Quality
One of the least studied areas of 
occupational licensing is its influence 
Figure 1  Percent of Uber Driver-Partners Remaining Active, by City
SOURCE: Uber Technologies, Inc.
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parts of New Jersey. The results of the 
data analysis using the quasi-random 
assignment of rides methodology 
show very little statistically significant 
differences in measured quality by 
riders through measures of rider 
satisfaction. Also, there was little or no 
difference in the safety of rides based 
on the number of driver hard stops, 
rapid accelerations, or complaints to 
the company of poor ride performance, 
based on whether the driver was from 
a jurisdiction that required a license in 
order to work.  
Implications for Policy
Two of the most rapidly growing 
segments of the labor market are 
the growth of the gig economy and 
occupational regulations in the 
labor market through licensing by 
government. Uber is faced with both 
issues because of its business model. 
As current findings suggest, cities that 
impose rigorous licensing standards, 
such as New York, have fewer Uber 
drivers per capita and higher base fares 
than either Chicago or San Francisco. 
The evidence from a quasi-experiment 
in New York and New Jersey suggests 
that there are few gains from 
occupational licensing of ride-sharing 
providers as assessed through customer 
satisfaction or measures of customer 
safety. Before state or local government 
enact additional regulations, access to 
the labor market and its influence on 
customer prices, satisfaction, and safety 
need to be considered as key elements 
of governmental labor market licensing 
policies. 
NOTES
1. DMR Statsitics http://expandedramb 
lings.com/index.php/uber-statistics/ 
(accessed July 7, 2017). 
2. Data provided from company sources, 
June 8, 2017. 
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Extending Work Life
Can Employers Adapt 
When Employees Want 
to Delay Retirement?
Robert Clark and Melinda Sandler Morrill
According to the authors of this WEfocus Series 
book, “Many policy analysts, economists, and 
demographers have argued that individuals must 
extend their work lives if they are to achieve their 
desired standard of 
living in retirement. 
Increases in longevity 
imply that individuals 
who leave the labor 
force at traditional 
retirement ages 
must either save 
more during their 
working careers or 
consume less during 
their retirement. Reductions in the generosity of 
employer- and government-funded retirement 
programs exacerbate this problem. Thus, workers 
today must save more than their predecessors to 
achieve the same level of retirement well-being. 
The idea seems clear—working longer and 
retiring later is the only way future retirees can 
sufficiently finance their retirement.”
While working longer may be necessary to 
support more years in retirement, few studies 
have examined this phenomenon from the 
employer perspective. This book seeks to fill that 
gap by providing a comprehensive assessment 
of the costs and benefits to employers of 
accommodating an increasing desire for delayed 
or phased retirement.
88 pp. 2016
$14.99 paper 978-0-88099-528-3
PDF is free at research.upjohn.org/up_press/237/
How Did Employee 
Ownership Firms 
Weather the Last Two 
Recessions?
Employee Ownership, 
Employment Stability, and 
Firm Survival: 1999–2011
Fidan Ana Kurtulus and Douglas L. Kruse
Employee ownership firms offer workers the 
opportunity to own a stake in the firms where 
they work. This 
affords them the 
ability to share in 
profits and have a 
voice in firm-related 
decision making. In 
this comprehensive 
new book, Kurtulus 
and Kruse provide 
new evidence on 
whether employee 
ownership firms are better equipped to survive 
recessions. In particular, they focus on broad-
based employee ownership, which includes 
ownership at all levels in the firm’s hierarchy.
The authors begin by defining employee 
ownership, and then discuss the prevalence of such 
firms in the United States. They also examine how 
employee ownership affects employment stability 
and why employee ownership firms have survived 
recessions more successfully than other firms.
Kurtulus and Kruse conclude by saying that the 
benefits they observed in employee ownership 
firms, particularly the greater employment 
stability and survival rates, can help the overall 
economy. Therefore, increased government 
support to broaden employee ownership 
programs is merited. 
178 pp. 2016
$18 paper 978-0-88099-525-2
$40 cloth 978-0-88099-526-9
Workers’ Compensation: 
Analysis for Its Second 
Century
H. Allan Hunt and Marcus Dillender
Workers’ compensation (WC) is the original form 
of social insurance as well as the first no-fault 
insurance program. Under WC, workers receive 
compensation 
and treatment for 
workplace injuries 
and disease in 
exchange for giving 
up the right to sue 
their employers for 
negligence. Each 
state and Canadian 
province runs its own 
WC program, and 
how each is administered and the level of benefits 
provided vary considerably. Therefore, assessing 
best practices among these programs is tricky. 
H. Allan Hunt and Marcus Dillender provide a 
succinct analysis of the state of WC programs 
in North America by focusing on three key 
performance issues: 1) the adequacy of 
compensation for those disabled in the 
workplace, 2) return-to-work performance for 
injured workers, and 3) prevention of disabling 
injury and disease. Following a brief introductory 
chapter that provides a discussion of the 
difficulties of trying to compare so many diverse 
programs, Hunt and Dillender devote a chapter 
to each of the three performance issues and 
provide empirical findings and useful guidance 
for policymakers and researchers as they set 
their sights on adapting WC for the twenty-first 
century.
132 pp. 2017
$14.99 paper 978-0-88099-530-6
PDF is free at research.upjohn.org/up_press/244/
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